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1 Introduction
The introduction of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into the agri-food system has sparked
controversy. On one hand, currently available GM crops allow returns for some companies up-
stream in the agricultural supply chain and productivity gains for many producers, a part of which
can be transferred to consumers through price reductions on final products. On the other hand,
some political and farm groups, environmentalists, consumers and citizens oppose them. Reasons
for this opposition include perceived potential environmental and health risks, opposition to the
private appropriation of genetic resources, and ethical concerns. The ways in which public author-
ities have been regulating GMOs, compromising between the interests of these opposing groups,
have been influenced by the political shape of the controversy. Interest group involvement and
public opinions have been different across countries and, as a consequence, current GMO regula-
tions vary greatly. Notably, the main countries where GMOs are produced, like the United States,
Argentina, Brazil, Canada or India, have developed neither mandatory labeling of GMOs nor a spe-
cific legislation addressing coexistence issues. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the European
Union (EU) has adopted mandatory labeling of GMOs and has defined a framework to regulate
the coexistence of GM and non-GM crops in fields. In this paper we propose a theoretical market
and welfare analysis of this coexistence policy, a topic that has only been partially addressed by
economists so far. Our model accounts for both ex ante coexistence regulations, such as isolation
distances between fields, and ex post liability measures, by which GMO producers compensate
non-GMO producers for economic damages due to GMO commingling in their harvest. We iden-
tify and discuss the contrasting effects of these two types of coexistence regulations in light of the
literature on the economic analysis of law.
The considerable and lasting societal opposition to GMOs in the EU has led to numerous
revisions of the regulatory framework in an attempt to restore public confidence (see Devos et al.,
2006, for a thorough analysis). In particular, GM labeling has been made mandatory on the premise
that consumers have a right to information and that labeling enables them to make informed choices
(EC, 1997; EC, 2003a). More precisely, any food or feed product containing GMOs has to be
labeled as such, unless it contains less than 0.9% of GM material and this presence is adventitious
or technically unavoidable (EC, 2003a). The implementation of this regulation is complicated by
sampling uncertainties and measurement errors, so that in practice operators typically use much
lower contractual thresholds (0.01% to 0.1%) (Bertheau, 2012).
This labeling legislation indeed provides consumers with information, although this informa-
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tion is incomplete and restricted to the specific labeling requirements defined in this legislation.
The right to make an informed choice, however, only follows when both GM and non-GM products
are available in the market. This issue is addressed in the first version of the EC recommendations
on coexistence, published in 2003 (EC, 2003b). This version of the recommendations points out
that the ability of the food industry to deliver a high degree of consumer choice depends on the
ability of the agricultural sector to maintain different production systems. It defines coexistence
as the ability of farmers to make a practical choice between conventional, organic and GM-crop
production, in compliance with the legal obligations for labeling and/or purity standards. To pre-
vent potential economic losses and other impacts of the admixture of GM and non-GM crops, this
recommendation allows Member States to impose mandatory regulations on farmers growing GM
crops in order to limit GMO presence in non-GM crops. The second version of the EC recom-
mendations on coexistence, issued in 2010, retreats from this vision of coexistence as ensuring
freedom of choice. Indeed, it no longer provides a formal definition of coexistence, defining coex-
istence measures simply as measures to avoid the unintended presence of GMOs in conventional
and organic crops (EC, 2010).
Existing national coexistence regulations rely mainly on isolation distances, which define a
minimum spacing between GM plantings and those non-GM plantings dedicated to identity pre-
served (IP) non-GM markets, in order to limit gene flows from GM fields to neighboring non-GM
fields. These isolation distances may be planted with a non-GM variety of the same crop, planted
with another crop, or left uncultivated. In some countries, either instead of isolation distances or
as a complement to them, GMO farmers may adopt mandatory buffer zones by planting strips at
the outer border of the GM field with a non-GM variety of the same crop, or by staggering sowing.
In addition, within the framework of national civil law, Member States may also adopt specific
provisions for liability in cases of GMO admixture. These provisions may include the definition
of procedures to compensate the economic damage suffered by non-GMO producers who end up
facing a GMO admixture in their harvest above the tolerance threshold. Currently defined liability
rules for farmers cultivating GMOs vary between states. In some countries GMO farmers must
subscribe to an insurance scheme or provide a financial guarantee to feed a compensation fund,
and are still liable even if they follow mandatory regulations set up to limit the extent of admix-
ture. Other countries have not introduced specific liability rules and rely on general civil liability
(Beckmann et al., 2006; EC, 2009; Koch, 2010).
The practical experience of these regulations is yet limited. At the present time, Bt maize is
the only GM crop grown in the EU in significant amounts: 90% of Bt maize production takes
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place in Spain where no specific legislation addressing coexistence issues is yet in place, while
the remainder of production takes place in Portugal, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Roma-
nia. Austria, France, Greece, Hungary, Germany and Luxembourg currently apply bans on GMO
cultivation, via safeguard clauses on GMO events (Lusser et al., 2012; USDA FAS, 2011; EC,
2012). In Portugal, where coexistence regulations have already been put into practice, authorities
have observed good compliance with ex ante coexistence regulations and the implementation of ex
post regulation has not been necessary, as no excessive GMO admixture in non-GM crops has yet
been observed. The Portuguese case should be extrapolated with caution, however, as the current
adoption rate of Bt maize in Portugal is only 4 % (with a higher adoption in some regions, up to
20 %) (Quedas and de Carvalho, 2012).
From an economic perspective, the rejection by some consumers of GMO technology, which
is advantageous for some producers, splits the pre-existing market in two: one market for the non-
GM product, another for the GM product. In a situation where consumers have a higher valuation
for non-GM products, only gene flows from GM crops to non-GM crops can generate economic
losses. This makes the risk unilateral: the cultivation of GM crops creates a negative externality
on non-GMO producers, because their harvest may be downgraded if GMO commingling occurs
at levels above the labeling threshold. Non-GMO commingling in GM crops, on the other hand,
has no economic impact.
The law and economic literature addresses how to choose between ex ante safety regulation
and ex post liability, or how to combine both types of regulations, in order to correct an externality.
Because the advantages of each instrument are context specific, there is no definitive judgment on
the superiority of either one.1 Less attention has been paid to the joint use of ex ante and ex post
policies, although their complementarity is widespread in practice for the control of environmental
and products-related external costs. In this literature, the objective is to find the combination of
liability rules and safety standards to be imposed on firms in order to minimize the expected social
cost of accidents (Shavell, 1984b; Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson, 1990; Burrows, 1999; Schmitz,
2000; Hiriart et al., 2004). These models share three common features. First, each party causing
harm may be held individually liable ex post. The threat of suit causes each potential injurer to
internalize the expected social damages and therefore to undertake a positive level of care ex ante.
Second, these models consider non-market externalities. Third, these models assume unilateral
1See Shavell (1984a) for a discussion of the theoretical determinants of the relative desirability of safety regulation
and liability, and Desquilbet and Poret (2012) for a discussion in the context of the coexistence between GM and
non-GM crops.
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accident: no decisions are made by potential victims and only potential injurers can take precaution
to reduce the probability of causing an accident.
The context of GM / non-GM coexistence regulation is different for three reasons. First, the
externality is a form of non-point source pollution. Since it is technically impossible to trace the
admixture created by gene flow to a definite source, it is not possible to hold each party individually
liable for the harm it has caused. Second, the externality created by GM gene flow affects a market.
Its regulation therefore affects the availability of choices faced by producers and consumers, as
well as prices and quantities on the markets of both the harming and the harmed products. Third,
gene flow is a case of bilateral accident: both the non-GM and GM producers may influence
the probability or the magnitude of admixture through their choice of care levels. Therefore, the
results of the law and economic literature cannot be directly transposed to the case of GM / non
GM coexistence.
In this coexistence case, because it is possible that the perpetrators could avoid facing a suit
for harm done, we can expect that tort liability alone is not adapted and that ex ante safety regula-
tion is warranted (Shavell, 1984a). In addition, there may be a case for ex post compensation by
GM farmers for economic losses faced by non-GM farmers, because technical ex ante coexistence
measures do not entirely eliminate the risk of gene flow. Then, ex ante safety regulation and tort li-
ability may complement each other: their joint use may optimally correct inefficiencies that appear
when only one approach is used to correct an externality. This view is supported by the analysis
of Beckmann et al. (2010) on GM / non-GM coexistence, who conclude that a combination of ex
ante regulations and ex post liability rules is superior to precautionary ex ante regulations alone.
However, these authors do not make market effects endogenous. It is a priori not evident to what
extent these results apply to coexistence in the GM and non-GM markets.
Our objective in this paper is to assess the optimal combination of ex ante and ex post regu-
lations to impose on GMO producers in order to reduce their harm, taking into account market
effects. Throughout the paper, we also maintain the assumption that it is impossible to hold each
GMO producer individually liable for the harm he or she causes (circumstances in which the law
can relax causation requirements are discussed in the conclusion). Furthermore, our model would
not be tractable if we allowed that both GMO and non-GMO farmers may undertake actions to
reduce gene flow. We make the simplifying assumption that the accident is unilateral and that non-
GMO producers do not undertake activities of their own, for example isolation distances in their
fields, to reduce gene flow. Our model is in accordance with the EU regulations on coexistence,
where property rights are mainly assigned to non-GMO producers at the farm stage, in the sense
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that GMO farmers are responsible for ensuring the GM-free status of non-GMO farmers or com-
pensate them otherwise, as discussed in Beckmann et al., 2011. These authors, as well as Ceddia
et al. (2011), study the alternative cases where only GMO farmers or only non-GMO farmers take
measures to reduce gene flow, but do not study the case where both types of farmers take such
measures simultaneously; in addition, both papers assume that market prices are exogenous.
While a substantial agronomic literature addresses the effects of alternative ex ante regulations
on GMO admixing (see e.g. Sanvido et al., 2008; Ceddia et al., 2009; Devos et al., 2008a), there are
yet few economic studies analyzing the impacts of coexistence regulations. Market and welfare
models of GMO introduction in the presence of consumer aversion for GMOs usually assume
that IP producers bear all the costs of segregation and identity preservation activities necessary
to keep the GMO content of their product below the regulatory threshold. In these models, no
ex ante or ex post coexistence regulations are in place to mitigate the negative externality exerted
by GMO producers (Lapan and Moschini, 2004; Fulton and Giannakas, 2004; Moschini et al.,
2005; Lapan and Moschini, 2007). Desquilbet and Bullock (2009) assume that the existence of
the IP sector also imposes externality costs on GMO producers, because they lose flexibility in
producing, moving and storing grain. But these authors do not model coexistence regulations
either. Munro (2008) discusses policy options to restore efficiency, using a stylized market model
of GM and non-GM crops in which GMO producers exert a negative spatial externality on non-
GMO producers. He shows that market-based instruments such as a tax on GM seeds or a subsidy
on non-GM production may be insufficient to ensure production efficiency. However, he does not
analyze ex ante or ex post coexistence regulations, and his discussion is not related to the current
EU regulatory framework for coexistence.
The analysis of Demont et al. (2008 and 2009) is more in line with the current EU regulations.
Demont et al. (2008) argue that mandatory isolation distances may be overly stringent. If a farmer
willing to adopt GMOs has a neighbor wishing to grow the non-GM crop, this farmer may prefer
cultivate the non-GM crop rather than to implement an isolation distance in its own field. This
farmer’s decision may, in turn, deter another neighbor from adopting GMOs, in a similar fashion.
The authors refer to this phenomenon as a “domino effect”. Demont et al. (2009) simulate the
effects of two alternative spatial ex ante coexistence regulations: an isolation distance and a pollen
barrier. The isolation distance is a perimeter surrounding a non-GM field in which no GM crop
may be grown. The pollen barrier is a field border between a GM and a non-GM field, of a smaller
width than the isolation distance, which must be planted with a non-GM variety but harvested and
marketed with the GM crop. The pollen barrier may border either the GM field or the non-GM
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field, if the GMO farmer compensates the non-GMO farmer for the cost of this barrier. In this
setting, the authors argue that small, negotiable pollen barriers are preferable to large isolation
distances, especially if market premiums for non-GM IP crops are low or non-existent. Desquilbet
and Bullock (2010) question the generality of these results on two grounds. First, the authors
include only producer profits in their analysis, ignoring consumer utility. Second, they adopt
some restrictive assumptions, such as the absence of any non-GM crop harvest downgrading with
either of the two instruments, and the exogeneity of GM and non-GM prices and adoption rates.
Demont et al. (2010) argue that their 2009 article aims at analyzing the flexibility of spatial ex ante
coexistence regulations and that market effects can be kept exogenous in this analysis. Gray et al.
(2011) devise a model to endogenously determine the efficient width of pollen barriers depending
on actual gene flows and whether the pollen barrier is implemented in the GM or the non-GM field.
As shown by Groeneveld et al. (2012), coordination of land use allocations is another means to
attain flexibility in coexistence rules and to reduce the impact of minimum distance requirements.
The analysis in these last two papers is also conducted with exogenous market prices. Another way
to reduce the burden of coexistence regulations is for neighboring farmers to coordinate their crop
locations so as to minimize the risk of gene flow. This approach studied by Furtan et al. (2007) in
the case where non-GM producers are responsible for ensuring the non-GM status of their crop.
In this paper, our aim is to contribute to this economic literature by analyzing the impact of ex
ante and ex post coexistence regulations on prices and market shares of GM and non-GM products,
on coexistence achievement, and on global and interest group welfare. We adopt the typical mod-
eling assumptions that, compared to non-GMOs, GMOs are seen as an inferior good by consumers
but allow productivity gains for producers. These assumptions only hold for currently commer-
cialized GMOs that are mainly insect-resistant or herbicide-tolerant crops; a different model set-up
would be required to analyze GMOs in the commercial pipeline, such as those with altered nutri-
tional composition. To keep our model analytically tractable, we do not model the organic sector.
Analyzing the effects of GMO introduction in a market that is already differentiated between con-
ventional and organic products would be more consistent with the EU regulatory framework on
coexistence. Moschini et al. (2005) introduce this more realistic feature in their model but then
resort to simulations in their analysis.
We develop a non-spatial, stylized model where ex ante coexistence regulations impose buffer
zones on which GMO producers must grow a non-GM crop. For simplicity, we assume that GMO
farmers comply perfectly with these technical measures (even though they bear additional costs
because of this regulation). In our model, GMO farmers are willing to plant a non-GM buffer zone
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at the border of their GM field, and therefore no domino effect occurs. Moreover, we do not allow
coordination between farmers. We also assume that non-GMO farmers do not take any measures
to prevent GMO commingling caused by gene flow. These producers face a probability of harvest
downgrading that decreases with both the ex ante regulation level (larger buffer zones diminish
admixture risks) and the regulatory tolerance threshold for GMO content in non-GM products. We
assume that when ex post regulations are in place, GMO farmers may contribute to a compensation
fund via a tax on GM seeds, and that the government also contributes to this compensation fund
(via taxpayer money) in order to exactly compensate profit losses of non-GMO farmers facing
harvest downgrading. We use this model to analyze the effects of ex ante and ex post coexistence
regulations on market and welfare outcomes. A primary characteristic of our model is to allow
prices, GMO adoption rates and the extent of non-GM harvest downgrading to be endogenous.
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the general assumptions that are used in
the model. Section 3 presents the different results according to the regulations in place. Section 4
concludes.
2 Model
We assume that producers are profit-maximizers and may produce three different types of a par-
ticular crop. The first one is produced using a GM seed and is indexed by g. The second type of
grain, indexed by n, is produced from a non-GM seed but is not sold as IP: either it is produced
by non-GMO producers but downgraded because its GMO content is above the regulatory thresh-
old, or it is produced by GMO producers on some part of their crop area to comply with an ex
ante coexistence regulation, and is blended with the GMO harvest. Consumers consider n and g
to be the same product, referred to here as regular (indexed by r). The third type, indexed by i,
is the IP grain: it is grown from a non-GM seed by non-GM producers, and has a GMO content
below the regulatory threshold. We concentrate on the agricultural stage, which is the target of EU
coexistence regulations, and assume that no additional commingling occurs at the handling and
processing stages.2
2The cross-pollination from GM maize to conventional maize is considered to be the main source of adventitious
GM presence in non-GM maize harvests (Czarnak-Klos and Rodriguez-Cerezo, 2010).
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2.1 Consumers
As in Fulton and Giannakas (2004) and Lapan and Moschini (2007), we model the regular good
as the low-quality good, and the IP good as the high-quality good, in a vertical differentiation
framework a la Mussa and Rosen (1978). Note that in doing so we ignore two important as-
pects of consumer behavior with respect to GMOs and non-GMOs. First, several dimensions of
consumers’ negative attitudes towards GMOs relate to their public-good attributes (for example,
environmental effects, ethical issues such as the interaction between man and nature, or inequity
resulting from biotechnology sector concentration), and therefore the welfare effects of GMOs
for consumers cannot be assessed through markets and prices alone (Desquilbet and Poret, 2012).
Second, the marketing of GM and non-GM products depends heavily on strategic interactions be-
tween retailers, and not only on consumer concern (Lusk, 2011). The simplifications we adopt in
this article are common to most existing market models of GMOs and non-GMOs.
We assume a continuum of consumers characterized by a willingness to pay for quality 
distributed uniformly between 0 and 1. Each consumer consumes either one unit of the regular
good (r), or one unit of the IP good (i), or nothing. The quality of the IP good is normalized to
1. Consuming the regular product results in a discount in quality a 2 (0; 1) (that is, the perceived
quality of the GM good is 1   a). The parameter a can be viewed as the consumers’ degree of
aversion to GM products. Then, the utility of the consumer with a willingness to pay for quality 
is given by: 8>><>>:
   pi if he buys one unit of the IP good,
(1  a)  pr if he buys one unit of the regular good, and
0 if he buys neither good,
(1)
where pi is the per-unit grain price of the IP good and pr is the per-unit grain price of the regular
good.
The following threshold values allow us to characterize consumers’ choices (we omit their
price arguments): 8>><>>:
r = pr
1 a ;
i = pi;e = pi pr
a
:
(2)
Consumers of the regular good are characterized by  > r and  < e (they obtain a positive
utility from consuming the regular good, and a higher utility from consuming the regular good
rather than the IP good). Consumers of the IP good are characterized by  > i and  > e (they
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obtain a positive utility from consuming the IP good, and a higher utility from consuming the IP
good rather than the regular good). Immediate calculations show that the threshold values of 
must verify r < i < e, or r = i = e, or e < i < r. Omitting the argument a, our utility
functions imply the following demand functions:3
When r < i < e;
8<: Dr(pr; pi) = min(e; 1) min(r; 1);Di(pr; pi) = 1 min(e; 1): (3)
When e  i  r;
8<: Dr(pr; pi) = 0;Di(pr; pi) = 1 min(i; 1): (4)
2.2 Producers
2.2.1 Basic assumptions
We assume the existence of a continuum of competitive producers characterized by a parameter
, distributed uniformly on [0; 1]. This parameter represents per-unit production costs for the GM
crop, which differ depending on land quality. We assume that all producers face an additional
cost v 2 (0; 1] when they produce the non-GM crop (for which total per-unit production costs are
therefore  + v). Yield is identical for the two grain types n and g and is normalized to one.4 The
profit obtained if neither the regular nor the IP crop is grown is normalized to zero.
In the absence of gene flows and coexistence regulation, per-unit profit functions are pr   
for GMO producers and pi   v for non-GMO producers. We now define these profit functions
in the presence of gene flow from GM to non-GM crops, and when the government implements
labeling and coexistence regulations.
3Given that  is distributed uniformly between 0 and 1, as long as the threshold values e, r and i are between 0
and 1, demand functions for the regular and the IP good are respectively e   r and 1   e when r < i < e, 0 and
1 i when e  i  r. From their definitions, r and i are higher than 0. e appears in these demand functions only
when r < i < e, in which case it also has to be higher than 0. However, the three thresholds values may be higher
than 1. Equations (3) and (4) take such possible cases into account. (For example, when e  i  r, consumers of
the IP good are characterized by i <  and 0    1. If i > 1, there is no demand for the IP good, which is what
we obtain in equation (4) given that min(i; 1) = 1 in this case).
4With higher yields for GM crops, the welfare-enhancing effect of GMO adoption would be stronger and coexis-
tence regulations imposing a burden on GMO producers would be less likely to improve welfare.
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2.2.2 Coexistence regulations
Non-GMO producers sell their harvest as IP, at price pi, if its GMO content is below the regulatory
threshold. Otherwise, their production is downgraded; that is, sold as regular at price pr. In the
absence of regulation, we assume that a proportion 0  h0  1 of the IP crop is downgraded.
There is no coexistence issue if h0 = 0, that is, if the GMO content of non-GM crops is always
below the regulatory threshold, even in the absence of any measures to limit gene flow. When
h0 > 0, an ex ante coexistence regulation mandates each GMO producer to undertake a level of
effort e 2 [0; h0] to reduce the gene flow towards non-GM crops. This level of effort represents the
proportion of his or her land that must be planted with the non-GM variety and mixed with the GM
production for sale as regular. This formulation captures in a stylized fashion ex ante regulations
such as buffer zones, which prevent GMO producers from growing GMOs too close to non-GM
fields.5 For simplicity, we assume that the cost of effort for GMO farmers is solely the additional
cost of the non-GM crop, v, on the proportion of land e planted with the non-GM variety, and that
GMO farmers comply perfectly with the mandatory effort without costly enforcement. We discuss
in the conclusion how relaxing this assumption would affect our results.
Noting the aggregate production of the GM good as Qg, we model the probability of down-
grading as a decreasing function of the effort undertaken by GMO producers:
h(e;Qg) = (h0   e)Ind(Qg); (5)
where Ind(Qg) is an indicator function equal to zero if Qg = 0, and equal to 1 otherwise.6
The functional form of h(:), chosen for its simplicity, verifies several intuitive properties. First,
the probability of downgrading is decreasing in the level of ex ante regulation, e. The higher this
level, the lower the amount of GM gene flow towards non-GM fields. Second, none of the non-
GM production is downgraded when the effort of GMO producers is maximal (h(h0; Qg) = 0). We
assume that non-GMO producers do not undertake any effort on their own to reduce the probability
5The actual constraint brought about by ex ante regulations in real landscapes is more complicated for two reasons.
First, a GMO producer does not have to implement the ex ante regulation if he knows at planting time that his neighbors
will not choose to grow identity-preserved non-GM crops. Second, the size and isolation of fields vary, making
the proportion of land affected by the ex ante regulation heterogenous across producers. We abstract from these
considerations for simplicity.
6It could be more realistic to assume that the probability of downgrading depends on the relative proportion of
GMOs in total production ( QgQg+Qi ). However, the model would not be solvable with this assumption. Additionally,
the probability of downgrading the non-GM production of one farmer mainly depends on whether or not his neighbor
cultivates GMOs, not on the total GM production.
11
of downgrading in their fields. They could, in fact, affect this probability. Separate harvesting of
different field areas is one way this might be achieved: farmers could harvest and deliver the border
rows of their fields as a regular crop, while dedicating the interior of their fields, less susceptible to
gene flows from outside, to an IP supply channel. Allowing non-GMO farmers to undertake such
activities would make the derivation of endogenous market effects excessively cumbersome.
The government may also implement an ex post regulation by setting up a compensation fund
that exactly compensates the profit losses incurred by non-GMO producers if their production gets
downgraded. We define this ex post regulation by an indicator function:
L =
8<: 0 if no ex post regulation is in place,1 if ex post regulation is in place.
We assume that when a compensation fund is in place (L = 1), the regulator uses two instru-
ments to compensate profit losses of non-GMO producers: a per-unit tax t on GM seed paid by
GMO producers, with t  0, and a government participation with taxpayer money.
To keep the model as simple as possible, we do not account for administrative costs of setting
up and managing the compensation fund. Such costs lower welfare when the compensation fund
is in place. We assume, as well, that the only economic loss suffered by IP producers in the
event of a product downgrade is the price difference between the IP good and the regular good.
Downgrading may in fact entail additional costs for IP producers, such as the loss of an outlet,
possible breach of contract, and the costs associated with finding a new outlet for the downgraded
product. Accounting for such costs would increase the losses resulting from downgrading, and the
benefits of avoiding downgrading through ex ante regulation would therefore be higher. Several
countries in the European Union have set up, or envisage setting up, compensation funds or more
complex schemes of ex post regulation. The compensation funds are financed either by GMO
producers, through private liability insurance or through taxation, or by the state (Koch, 2012).
Alternative schemes are designed to relax the normal causation requirements of a direct and definite
link between the damage and the defendant, thus making it possible for several neighboring GMO
farmers to be jointly liable for incurred losses in a non-GM field. These forms of ex post regulation
are not modeled here and are discussed in the conclusion.
Beyond the farm stage, coexistence regulations no longer apply, therefore costly segregation
and identity preservation actions have to be undertaken in order to maintain the integrity of IP
products throughout the supply chain (Lapan and Moschini, 2004; Fulton and Giannakas, 2004;
Moschini et al., 2005; Desquilbet and Bullock, 2009). Because this is not the topic of our paper,
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for simplicity reasons we do not model the related costs. We discuss the effects of introducing a
positive unit cost of identity preservation in the conclusion.
2.2.3 Per-unit profit, aggregate supply, economic damage, tax revenue
We let g(:) denote the profit obtained by GMO producers, who plant GM seeds on a proportion
(1   e) of their area and non-GM seeds on the remaining proportion e. We let i(:) denote the
expected profit of non-GMO producers. Given that the government implements the instruments e
(ex ante regulatory effort imposed on GMO producers), L (ex post liability of GMO producers)
and t (GM seed tax), omitting the argument v, the per-unit profit functions take the form:
g(pr; e; L; t;) = pr   ev   (1  e)Lt   = g   ;
i(pr; pi; Qg; e; L;) = pi   v   (1  L)(pi   pr)h(e;Qg)   = i   
Threshold values g and i are defined so that all producers characterized by  < j obtain a
positive profit from producing good j. From the profit functions defined above, it is immediate that
when i > g, the IP good (i) is more profitable than the GM good (g) for all producers. In this
case, all producers with   i grow the IP crop, the GM good is not produced and there is neither
coexistence nor downgrading. On the contrary, when i < g, the IP good is not produced, there is
no coexistence and all producers with   g are GMO producers. Due to the ex ante regulation,
a proportion 1   e of their production is GM while a proportion e is non-GM; however, all this
production is sold as regular and there is no coexistence. All producers obtain the same profit from
i and g when i = g. In this case, all producers with   g produce and are indifferent between
growing the GM crop or the IP crop and coexistence will occur as long as there is a positive demand
for both goods in equilibrium. In this case, individual supply functions cannot be defined for the
regular and the IP good and only an aggregate supply function can be defined. Moreover, because
a proportion h of IP production gets downgraded, the proportion of production accounted for by
the IP good must be less than (1  h) of the total production (while the regular good must account
for least h of the total production). Let Qgs , Q
n
s and Q
i
s denote quantities supplied of goods g, n
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and i. Omitting the argument v, the conditions above imply the following supply correspondence:
S(pr; pi; Qg; e; L; t)  (Sg(pr; pi; Qg; e; L; t); Sn(pr; pi; Qg; e; L; t); Si(pr; pi; Qg; e; L; t))
= (Qgs; Q
n
s ; Q
i
s) :
when i < g;
8>><>>:
Qgs = (1  e)max(g; 0);
Qns = emax(g; 0);
Qis = 0:
(6)
when i > g;
8>><>>:
Qgs = 0;
Qns = 0;
Qis = max(i; 0):
when i = g;
8>><>>:
Qgs +Q
n
s +Q
i
s = max(g; 0)
Qgs +Q
n
s 2 (h(e;Qg)(Qgs +Qns +Qsi ); Qgs +Qns +Qis);
Qis 2 (0; (1  h(e;Qg))(Qgs +Qns +Qis)):
2.3 Definition of equilibrium and benchmark cases
Given the model parameters a and v and given the policy instruments e, L, t, we have that pr, pi,
Qg 2 R3+ is an equilibrium if: (a) Qg = Qgs (the production of the GM good in the downgrading
function is equal to the quantity supplied of the GM good), (b) (Qgs; Q
n
s ; Q
i
s) 2 S(pr; pi; Qg; e; L; t)
(each producer maximizes profits), (c) Qgs + Q
n
s = D
r(pr; pi; s), and Qri = D
i(pr; pi; s) (each
consumer maximizes utility and markets clear).
When GM and IP products coexist in the market, a proportion 1 h of IP producers’ production
is sold as IP, while a proportion h is downgraded. Given that the IP consumption is 1  e, the total
production of IP producers is therefore 1 e
1 h , and
h
1 h(1  e) of that total is downgraded. Given that
h = h0   e, this downgraded production is:
Qd =
(h0   e)(1  e)
1 + e  h0 : (7)
The unit profit loss on this downgraded production is equal to the price difference pi   pr.
Therefore, under coexistence, the total economic damage caused by downgrading is:
D = Qd(pi   pr): (8)
Maintaining the assumption of coexistence, the quantity of regular product consumed is e   r.
Since Qd of this quantity is accounted for by the downgraded production of IP producers, the
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production of GMO producers must account for the remaining e   r  Qd. A proportion (1  e)
of this production is sown with GM seeds. As a result, the revenue from the GM seed tax is:
T =
e   r  Qd (1  e)t: (9)
Finally, it is useful to consider a benchmark case where GMOs are introduced without labeling
and without coexistence regulations (e = L = 0). This benchmark is derived from a simplified
version of the model. The GM and non-GM goods provide per-unit profits g = pr    and
i = pi   v    respectively, while consumers demand only the cheapest product, with D(p) =
1   p
1 a . In this situation, only the GM good is produced and consumed, and the equilibrium
price is p0 = 1 a
2 a . The equilibrium quantity is Q
0 = 1
2 a and welfare is W
0 =
R p1r
0
(p0r   )d +R 1
1 p0r((1  a)  p
0
r)d =
(1 a)2
2(2 a) .
3 The effects of coexistence regulations
In what follows we examine three possible forms of regulation: a labeling policy, ex ante regula-
tion, and ex post liability.
3.1 Equilibrium characterization
Whether both, neither, or only one of the two types of goods is produced and consumed in equi-
librium depends on the values of the supply and demand parameters (v and a) and on the policy
instruments characterizing the ex ante and ex post regulations (e, L and t). Tables 1 and 2 below
summarize the equilibrium prices in each type of equilibrium and the conditions under which each
type of equilibrium may emerge, considering either ex ante regulation only (Table 1), or both ex
ante and ex post regulations (Table 2) (the proof is given in Appendix A.1).7
[Insert Table 1]
7Production and consumption choices are defined as follows. In a coexistence equilibrium, producers character-
ized by   g produce either the GM good with the mandatory buffer zones, or the non-GM IP good which is
subject to some downgrading. Consumers characterized by r    e consume the regular good, while consumers
characterized by  > e consume the IP good. In an equilibrium with only the regular crop, producers characterized
by   g all produce the GM good (sowing the non-GM seed on a proportion e of their crop area), while consumers
characterized by   r consume the regular good. Finally, in an equilibrium with only IP, producers characterized
by   i all produce the IP good, which is consumed by consumers characterized by   i.
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[Insert Table 2]
Figure 1 illustrates the configuration of equilibrium domains when only ex ante regulation is
in place. Areas with only regular production (r) and with coexistence (c) are separated by their
common frontier v2. The equilibrium with only the regular crop appears when consumers’ aversion
to GM products (a) is low and the additional cost of the non-GM crop (v) is high. As a rises
and v falls, the equilibrium changes: first to coexistence, then to exclusively IP cultivation. For
some parameter values, equilibria with both crops or with only regular cultivation coexist with an
equilibrium with IP cultivation alone. These multiple equilibria arise because the profit obtained
from IP cultivation depends on the presence of GMOs in other farmers’ fields. With only ex ante
regulation in place, IP producers are not compensated in the event of any downgrading.8
[Insert Figure 1]
With both ex ante and ex post regulations (Figure 2), IP producers are fully compensated for
any crop downgrading they face. GMO producers, on the other hand, face the same regulations
whether or not IP crops are actually cultivated. Starting from an equilibrium with regular cultiva-
tion alone, an increase in a and/or a decrease in v shifts the equilibrium towards coexistence, and
then to IP-only cultivation. No stable equilibrium emerges between curves v5 and v7, because of
the discontinuity in the downgrading of IP crops. The curve v5 represents the limit equilibrium
in which an infinitesimal amount of the GM crop is produced, resulting in the downgrade of a
proportion h of the IP production. The curve v7 is the limit equilibrium in which all producers are
indifferent between GM or IP production, but there is no demand for the regular crop, and there-
fore all producers produce the IP crop.9 Under both ex ante and ex post regulations no multiple
equilibria emerge, because unit profit functions do not depend on the specific equilibrium.10 Ex
post regulation (which compensates IP producers for the profit losses caused by crop downgrad-
ing) favors IP production; the area with regular-only production is therefore smaller, and the area
8More precisely, the unit profit i is written pi  v  (pi  pr)(h0  e)  if GMOs are cultivated, and pi  v 
if they are not, which allows for multiple equilibria.
9This area with no stable equilibrium would disappear if we assumed that downgrading was a function of the
proportion of GM production, and not only of the presence or absence of this production. Such an assumption,
however realistic, would prevent us from solving the model analytically.
10More precisely, the unit profit i is written pi   v    whether or not GMOs are cultivated, and the unit profit
g is written pr   ev   (1   e)t    whether or not IP crops are cultivated (in our model GMO producers have to
implement the buffer zone e and to pay the tax t regardless of whether IP crops are actually cultivated).
16
of IP-only cultivation is larger, under joint ex ante and ex post regulations (Figure 2) compared
with the case employing ex ante regulation alone (Figure 1).
[Insert Figure 2]
3.2 Coexistence regulations and the emergence of coexistence
We now analyze how changes in the regulations affect the emergence of coexistence. Freedom of
choice between GMOs and non-GMOs for producers and consumers is a stated objective of the
European recommendation on coexistence (EC, 2010). The set of parameter values for which this
freedom of choice is effective, in the sense that both goods do coexist on markets, is an indicator
of the achievement of this political goal.
Proposition 1. Effects of coexistence regulations on the emergence of coexistence
For given levels of the supply and demand parameters (v and a), and of the parameter charac-
terizing downgrading (h0), changes in coexistence regulations affect the types of goods produced
and consumed in equilibrium as follows.
For a given level of ex ante regulation, when ex post regulation is introduced, a former coex-
istence equilibrium may remain a coexistence equilibrium, change to an unstable equilibrium or
change to an equilibrium with only IP. A former equilibrium with only the regular crop may remain
an equilibrium with only the regular crop or change to a coexistence equilibrium.
With or without ex post regulation in place, an increase in the level of ex ante regulation may
cause an equilibrium with only the regular good to disappear in favor of a coexistence equilibrium,
or a coexistence equilibrium to disappear in favor an equilibrium with only IP.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The mechanisms at work when ex post regulation is introduced or when the level of ex ante
regulation is increased are alike: both regulation changes make the IP crop more profitable and the
GM crop less profitable, possibly making the IP good appear on the market, or causing the GM
good to disappear from the market.
As a consequence, the absence of IP goods on the market when no coexistence regulations are
in place does not necessarily indicate that consumers are not interested in them. It may be that gene
flow in fields, and the implied downgrading of IP production, makes such production too expensive
in the absence of regulation. This production choice may yet become profitable when coexistence
measures imposed on GMO producers reduce the probability of gene flow towards non-GM fields.
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This endogeneity of production choices therefore makes the analysis more complicated than what
is suggested in the literature, for example by Devos et al. (2008b) when they state that: “In markets
where consumers are unwilling to pay significant price premiums for GM-free maize, there is no
coexistence issue stricto sensu.”. Because producers’ incentives to supply GM or non-GM crops
are endogenous and subject to change when regulation is introduced, the absence of market signals
for IP crops is not an indicator that a policy favoring coexistence is not desirable.
To provide further insight on coexistence equilibria, we now study the quantity of each type of
good consumed and the quantity of IP production downgraded in these equilibria, depending on the
regulations in place. Table 3 summarizes the total quantities marketed in equilibrium (Q and Q0),
as well as IP consumption (Qi andQ0i), regular consumption (Qr andQ
0
r), and IP downgrading (Qd
and Q0d), under ex ante regulation alone (column 2) and with both ex ante and ex post regulations
(column 3). The table also details the effects of the level of ex ante regulation and of the labeling
threshold on these different quantities.
[Insert Table 3]
From the table it can be seen that IP consumption is higher with both coexistence regulations
in place than with ex ante regulation alone (Q0i > Qi), while total consumption is lower (or equal
when t = 0) (Q0  Q). This implies that regular consumption is also lower when both regulations
are implemented (Q0r < Qr). The quantity of IP downgraded is necessarily higher under the
combined regulations (Q0d > Qd), because ex post regulation encourages IP production, of which
a fixed proportion is downgraded.
When the level of technical standards (e) increases, under either one or both coexistence reg-
ulations, IP consumption increases while regular consumption and total consumption decrease.
This results from higher production costs for GM producers, as well as lower downgrading costs
for IP producers with ex ante regulation alone. When the parameter h0 (which characterizes the
proportion of downgrading) increases, the total equilibrium quantity is unchanged. When only
ex ante regulation is in place, an increase in h0 decreases revenues of IP producers, causing the
IP equilibrium quantity to decrease and the regular quantity to increase. With both regulations in
place, IP producers are compensated for losses due to downgrading, and an increase in h0 does not
affect the equilibrium quantities of the IP and the regular good.
The more complex effects of an increase in e or h0 on IP downgrading are detailed in the
following equations. The equivalent holds in the mixed policy condition, with variablesQ0d andQ
0
i
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in place of Qd and Qi.
@Qd
@e
=
h0
1  h0(1  e)
2664  Qi1  h0(1  e)| {z }
direct effect
+(1  e)@Qi
@e| {z }
supply effect
3775 ; (10)
@Qd
@h0
=
1  e
1  h0(1  e)
2664 Qi1  (1  e)h0| {z }
direct effect
+ h0
@Qi
@h0| {z }
effect onQi
3775 : (11)
An increase in e results in a reduction in the proportion of downgrading (negative direct effect)
and an increase of the supply of IP producers (indirect positive supply effect). The direct effect
dominates the indirect supply effect when v is sufficiently low, that is, when the IP production level
is sufficiently high. In this case, an increase in e results in a decrease in IP downgraded production.
When v is high, a increase in e increases the amount of IP production that is downgraded.
With both ex ante and ex post regulations in place, an increase in h0 only has the direct effect
of increasing the proportion of downgrading: the quantity of IP production which is downgraded
increases, with no effect on the level of IP production. With ex ante regulation alone, an increase in
h0 discourages IP production (negative indirect effect on Qi), which counterbalances the positive
direct effect. The positive direct effect dominates the negative indirect supply effect when v is
sufficiently low, that is, when the IP production level is sufficiently high. In this case, an increase
in h0 has the same effect as it does under a mixed policy, that is, increasing the amount of IP
production that is downgraded. When v is high, a increase in h0 results in a decrease in the amount
of IP production which is downgraded.
3.3 Market and welfare effects
With ex ante regulation alone, total welfare in a coexistence equilibrium is given by:
W =
Z g
0
(g   )d +
Z e
r
((1  a)  pr)d +
Z 1
e (   pi)d:
Proposition 2 below details the effects of labeling on total welfare, absent any coexistence
regulation. In other words, it compares the equilibrium without ex ante or ex post regulation
(e = L = 0) to the benchmark equilibrium in which GMOs are introduced without labeling. When
labeling allows the emergence of coexistence, it induces an increase in welfare by increasing the
utility of consumers who turn to the IP good.
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Proposition 2. Absent any coexistence regulation (e = L = t = 0), the introduction of labeling,
when it allows the emergence of coexistence, has no effect on any of the following: the price of the
regular good, total production and consumption, producers’ profits and the utility of consumers
who consume the regular good both in the presence and the absence of labeling. The utility of
consumers who consume the regular good in the absence of labeling and the (more expensive) IP
good in the presence of labeling increases, and total welfare increases.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Market and welfare effects of ex ante regulation are summarized in Proposition 3 below.
Proposition 3. In a coexistence equilibrium without ex post regulation, an increase in the level of
ex ante regulation causes the price of the regular good to increase and the price of the IP good to
decrease. Regular consumption decreases and IP consumption increases, resulting in a decrease
in total (regular + IP) consumption. Consumers of the regular good and producers are hurt, while
consumers of the IP good are better off. There exists ~v such that the introduction of a low level of
ex ante regulation is welfare-increasing if and only if v1 < v < ~v, with ~v 2 (v1; v2) for e = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
At initial market prices, the first effect of an increase in the ex ante regulation is to force GMO
farmers to dedicate some of their crop area to buffer zones sown with non-GM seeds, decreas-
ing their profitability while leaving their total production of regular good unchanged (since GM
and non-GM goods have identical yields in our setting). The aggregate production of IP produc-
ers is also unchanged, but the proportion of it which gets downgraded decreases. Therefore, the
profitability of the GM crop decreases while the profitability of the IP crop increases, and regular
production decreases while IP production increases (total production remains unchanged). As a
second effect, these changes tend to raise the price of the regular good and lower the price of the
IP good, thereby increasing the profitability of the regular crop and decreasing the profitability of
the IP crop (note that the two crops must be equally profitable for a coexistence equilibrium to be
sustained after the introduction of the regulation).
The possible welfare-increasing effect of the ex ante regulation arises because this regulation
forces GMO producers to internalize some of the costly gene flow externality that they exert to-
wards consumer-preferred IP good producers. This welfare-increasing effect arises when v is
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sufficiently low, that is, when IP consumption is sufficiently large compared to regular consump-
tion.11
We now turn to the case where both ex ante and ex post regulations are in place. Under such
conditions, aggregate welfare is the sum of producers’ profits and the utility of both types of
consumers, minus the damage funded by taxpayer money. The total compensation to IP producers
for any downgrading they suffer is D (Equation (8)), of which T (Equation (9)) is paid by the GM
seed tax revenue andD  T by taxpayers. In a coexistence equilibrium aggregate welfare is given
by:
W 0 =
Z g
0
(g   )d +
Z e
r
((1  a)  pr)d +
Z 1
e (   pi)d  D + T:
Proposition 4 below summarizes market and welfare effects in this case.
Proposition 4. In a coexistence equilibrium with ex post regulation, for a given level of ex ante
regulation, the introduction of a GM seed tax as as substitute to taxpayer funding for downgrading
compensation induces an increase in the price of the regular good and a decrease in the price
of the IP good. Producers’ profits and regular consumers’ utility decrease, while IP consumers’
utility increases. The total production level decreases, with a decrease in the regular quantity and
an increase in the IP quantity. IP downgrading increases. Total welfare decreases (therefore, the
optimal level of the tax on GM seeds is t = 0).
Assume now that ex post regulation is funded entirely by taxpayers (t = 0). There exist ~v01
and ~v02 such that, absent ex ante regulation, the introduction of labeling is welfare-increasing if
and only if v5je=t=0 < v and v < ~v01, and the introduction of a low level of ex ante regulation is
welfare-increasing if and only if v5je=t=0 < v and v < ~v02 (where ~v
0
i may be higher or lower than
v5je=t=0 and ~v0i 2 (0; v6je=t=0), i = 1; 2).
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
For any given level of ex ante regulation, with ex post regulation in place, social welfare is
maximized when the damage related to the externality is paid entirely through taxpayers’ money.
Transferring part of this payment to GMO producers through a GM seed tax introduces a market
distortion that impacts welfare negatively.
Compared with an unregulated equilibrium, the introduction of labeling and of ex post liability
funded entirely by taxpayers may increase total welfare when the enforced regulations allow co-
existence to emerge. These regulations do not change the price of the regular good, the producers’
11It can be shown that the lower v, the higher the IP consumption, and the lower the regular consumption.
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profit or the utility of consumers who continue to buy the GM good (given that for L = 1 and
t = e = 0, pr = p0). They allow some consumers to choose the IP good, which increases their
utility, but impose a burden on taxpayers. The necessary condition for welfare to increase with the
introduction of labeling, v5je=t=0 < ~v01, is more likely to hold when the proportion of downgrading,
h0, is small (it can be shown that v5je=t=0 is increasing in h0 while ~v01 is decreasing in h0). In such
a case, welfare increases with the introduction of labeling and ex post regulation when the overcost
of producing the IP good, v, is sufficiently small.
When an ex post regulation funded by taxpayers’ money protects IP producers from damages
related to the externality, introducing an ex ante regulation may increase total welfare. This is the
case when the aversion towards GMOs and the GM seed cost are large, and the additional cost
of non-GM production and the regulatory threshold are low. Indeed, under these conditions the
damage D under coexistence is decreasing with the level of the ex ante regulation, which allows
such a regulation to increase total welfare.
We now study the effects of the introduction of ex post regulation, funded entirely by taxpay-
ers, from a baseline equilibrium with ex ante regulation alone. The next three propositions address
successively the three possible equilibrium configurations that arise. In the first, from a coexis-
tence equilibrium with ex ante regulation alone, the introduction of ex post regulation maintains
coexistence; in the second, starting again from a coexistence equilibrium, the introduction of ex
post regulation shifts the equilibrium to one with only the IP good; and in the third, from an equi-
librium with only regular production, the introduction of ex post regulation shifts the equilibrium
towards coexistence.
Proposition 5. For given values of the other parameters, the introduction of ex post regulation
funded entirely by taxpayers maintains a coexistence equilibrium when v5 < v < v2. In this
case, the price of the regular good does not change while the price of the IP good decreases. Total
production and consumption are unchanged, with some former regular producers and some former
regular consumers turning to the IP good. Producers’ profits and the utility of consumers who
continue to consume the regular good are unchanged. The utility of continued and new consumers
of the IP good increases, but this increase is more than offset by the cost to taxpayers. Total welfare
therefore decreases.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
This proposition establishes that the implementation of taxpayer-funded ex post regulation in-
creases the utility of former or new consumers of the IP product only at the cost of a higher expense
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for taxpayers, and is therefore never a welfare-increasing policy option.
This result is not surprising given that the ex post regulation gives no incentive to GMO pro-
ducers to decrease the amount of damage they inflict on IP producers. This effect is a direct
consequence of our assumption that GMO producers never undertake any effort to decrease gene
flow in the absence of a restrictive ex ante policy. It is in accordance with the non-point source
nature of GM gene flow, which makes it possible for any individual producer to escape the threat
of being held individually liable for his actions, therefore giving him no incentive to internalize the
externality that he exerts on producers wishing to identity-preserve their non-GM crop.
Results are similar when the introduction of ex post regulation shifts the equilibrium configu-
ration from regular production alone (in which case the welfare level is simply
R g
0
(g   )d +R 1
r
((1  a)  pr)d) to coexistence, as indicated in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. For given values of the other parameters, the introduction of ex post regulation
funded entirely by taxpayers causes the equilibrium to shift from regular production alone to coex-
istence when Max(v2; v5) < v < v6. In this case, the price of the regular good does not change.
Total production and consumption are unchanged, with some former regular producers and some
former regular consumers turning to the IP good. Producers’ profits and the utility of consumers
who consume the regular good both in the presence and in the absence of ex post regulation are
unchanged. The utility of consumers who consume the regular good in the absence of ex post reg-
ulation and the (more expensive) IP good in the presence of ex post regulation increases, but this
increase is more than compensated by the cost to taxpayers. Total welfare therefore decreases.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
With a relatively high supply parameter (v), the introduction of ex post regulation allows co-
existence to emerge from a situation where only the regular crop was produced and consumed. In
this case, consumers willing to consume IP goods may request the enforcement of ex post liability
regulation. Such a policy would not affect producers and other consumers, but would be paid by
taxpayers.
Finally, the introduction of ex post regulation may also destroy coexistence, in favor of an
equilibrium with only IP (and with a welfare level given simply by
R i
0
(i   )d + R 1
i
((1  
ar)  pi)d)). The effects of such a transition are detailed in the following proposition.
Proposition 7. For given values of the other parameters, the introduction of ex post regulation,
funded entirely by taxpayers, shifts the equilibrium from coexistence to IP production alone when
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v1 < v < min(v2; v7). The new regulation results in a new price for IP goods which is above the
former price of the regular good and below the former price of the IP good. Total production and
consumption increase. Profit increases for every producer and utility increases for every consumer.
As a result, total welfare increases.
Proof. See Appendix A.8.
With a relatively low supply parameter (v), the introduction of ex post regulation causes co-
existence to disappear in favor of the IP good. This policy increases total welfare by eliminating
the damages caused by GMO cultivation, which decreases the price of the IP good and increases
producers’ profit.
Ex post regulation cannot reduce expected damages related to crop downgrading, because the
externality is a non-point source pollution. This regulation does not provide GMO producers
with any incentive to decrease the externality that they exert towards non-GMO producers in our
context. The results in Propositions 6 to 8 show that ex post regulation is favorable to IP consumers
but detrimental to taxpayers and welfare when it induces or maintains coexistence. This regulation
improves welfare only when it removes coexistence in favor of an equilibrium with only the IP
good, a situation that arises when consumer aversion to GMOs is high enough and the overcost of
producing the non-GM good is sufficiently low.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we examine the effects of ex ante and ex post regulation of GM and non-GM crop co-
existence in fields. To this aim, we define a framework that allows prices, and therefore production
and consumption choices, to be endogenous. We use a classical vertical differentiation framework
on the consumer side. On the production side, our model captures the main effects of coexistence
regulation. GM gene flow is a form of non-point source pollution and therefore GMO producers
do not, individually, have the appropriate incentives to correct the externality that they exert on
non-GMO producers. Ex ante technical measures such as buffer zones reduce GM gene flow, and
therefore reduce the risk of downgrading the non-GM production. Such measures are costly for
GMO producers, because they force them to give up more profitable GMO production on some
part of their crop area. Ex ante regulation reduces but does not eliminate the risk of gene flow. We
study one form of ex post regulation: a fund aimed at compensating IP producers for any loss of
profit due to downgrading, financed by GMO producers and/or the state.
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GM and non-GM coexistence presents an interesting example of how ex ante and ex post reg-
ulations can interact to reduce externalities. We find that a GM seed tax, as a substitute to taxpayer
funding for downgrading compensation, introduces a market distortion that always deteriorates
welfare. When it maintains or induces coexistence, ex post regulation entirely funded by taxpayers
favors IP consumers but reduces welfare overall, since it has no incentive effect on producers of the
regular good. The ex post regulation improves welfare only when its introduction causes the mar-
ket of the regular good, and therefore burdensome coexistence costs, to disappear. On the contrary,
ex ante regulation reduces the potential damage, that is, the risk of IP crop downgrading. We find
that ex ante technical measures may be welfare increasing, as long as consumers care sufficiently
for non-GM goods,and the cost advantage of GM production is modest.
In our model, we assume that segregation and identity preservation beyond the farm stage are
costless. With a positive unit cost of identity preservation beyond the farm stage, coexistence
equilibria would appear for a smaller range of parameter values. The IP price would be higher, and
therefore the utility of IP consumers lower, in coexistence equilibria. This positive cost of identity
preservation would make it is less likely that the introduction of coexistence regulations increases
welfare.
The results of this article hold under the assumption that the only cost imposed on GMO farm-
ers by ex ante coexistence regulations is the additional cost of producing the non-GM crop on the
area devoted to a buffer zone. These regulations would, in fact, impost additional operation costs
on GMO farmers, who would have to buy two different types of seeds and plant them separately.
These operations are inconvenient and can be time-consuming; furthermore, they may result in
yield losses due to delayed planting and extra costs during the growing season, particularly if the
GM and non-GM varieties have different characteristics. With such costs for GMO farmers, per-
fect compliance with ex ante regulations would be less likely in the absence of costly monitoring.
As a result, the regular crop would be produced in equilibrium for a smaller range of parameter
values. When it is produced, producers’ profits would be lower, the regular price would be higher
and the utility of regular consumers would be lower. Therefore, it would be less likely that the
introduction of ex ante coexistence regulation increases welfare.
A related topic not covered in our article is the potential for cooperation between neighboring
farmers to define more flexible ex ante coexistence measures. In particular, arrangements between
neighbors whereby a GMO farmer compensates a neighbor who implements a buffer zone in his
non-GM field may reduce the burdens on GMO farmers, as described above. The literature on
flexible coexistence measures (Demont et al;, 2008 and 2009; Gray, 2011; Groeneveld et al., 2013)
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could be extended to assess the effects of such arrangements on market and welfare outcomes.
For tractability reasons, our model assumes that all producers are identical. In reality, producers
are differentiated, and the degree to which regulation aligns with their interests varies greatly. We
expect that our main results would hold, however, with heterogenous producers. Notably, because
of the non-point nature of the externality exerted by GM producers towards IP producers, we
expect that the introduction of a compensation fund would still decrease welfare with heterogenous
producers. In this case, however, not only consumers but also producers of the IP good would
benefit from ex post compensation.
Other types of ex post regulations than the compensation fund studied here may incentivize
farmers. For example, tort law could be used to impose liability on the GMO farmer whose fields
is the nearest to a downgraded IP harvest. Alternatively, under joint and several liability, all GMO
farmers in a given area would be jointly liable for losses suffered by a non-GMO farmer, and it
would be the responsibility of these farmers to sort out their respective proportions of liability and
payment. This mechanismmay lead defendants to apportion damages among themselves insofar as
they can bargain easily at low transaction costs. Such liability schemes are more difficult to devise
and involve higher enforcement costs than a compensation fund. They could induce excessive
incentives for precaution, and reduce the profitability of the regular crop, causing the regular good
to disappear from the market in a wider range of situations. They could also, however, induce
farmers to adopt ex ante technical measures to prevent gene flow and therefore reduce the need for
ex ante coexistence regulation. The effects of such liability schemes, which go beyond the scope
of this paper, are discussed notably in Koch (2008), Koch (2010) and Koch (2012).
As a final point, labeling and coexistence regulations only partially address the market failure
arising from the positive public-good attributes that some consumers associate with non-GM goods
due, for example, to their perceptions about environmental issues, their attitudes towards interac-
tions between man and nature, possible opposition to the concentration of the upstream agricultural
sector, or questions on whether regulatory authorities have sufficient power to effectively regulate
companies that develop GMOs. Even in the case where some consumers perceive a high quality
difference between these two goods, as long as public-good attributes are driving their preferences,
they will not necessarily be reflected in a high willingness to pay, unless these consumers behave
altruistically. Other policies may mitigate these market failures (see Desquilbet and Poret, 2012).
Trust in public authorities may be reinforced by stronger risk assessment criteria, although this
must be balanced with increased authorization costs, which are already very high. More funda-
mentally, trust may be reinforced by a more transparent regulatory process, open to public scrutiny.
26
Opposition to GMOs which stem from their development by multinational corporations could, in
principle, be partly addressed by competition authorities. If such policies are not implemented, it
is likely that consumers who are strongly opposed to GMOs will not be satisfied with labeling and
coexistence policies alone.
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Table 1: Prices and equilibrium conditions with ex ante regulation alone
v1 =
a(1 + e  h0)[1 + (1  a)(h0   e)]
2(1  e) + ae(h0   e)(2 + e  h0)  a
v2 =
a(1 + e  h0)
1  e
v3 =
1  a
e
v4 =
a
2(1  e)  a
a0 =
1  e
1  e(h0   e)
- Coexistence: pr =
1  a
2  a(1 + ev); p

i = p

r +
(1  e)v
1 + e  h08<: a < a0v1 < v < v2
- Regular production alone: pr =
1  a
2  a(1 + ev)8<: a < a0v2  v < v3
- IP production alone: pi =
1
2
(1 + v)8<: if 2(1  e)  a; v < 1if 2(1  e) > a; v < v4
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Table 2: Prices and equilibrium conditions with ex ante and ex post regulations
v5 =
a(1 + (1  a)(h0   e)) + (1  e)(2  a(h0   e))t
2(1  e) + ae(h0   e)  a
v6 =
a
1  e + t
v7 =
a+ 2(1  e)t
2(1  e)  a
a1 = (1  e)(1  t)
- Coexistence: pr =
1  a
2  a(1 + ev + (1  e)t); p

i = p

r + (1  e)(v   t)8<: a < a1v5 < v < v6
- Regular production alone: pr =
1  a
2  a(1 + ev + (1  e)t)8<: a < a1v6  v
- IP production alone: pi =
1
2
(1 + v)8<: if 2(1  e)  a; v < 1if 2(1  e) > a; v < v7
Note: When t = 0, v7 is equal to v4 .
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A Appendixes
A.1 Characterization of equilibrium
The parameters g and i are given by g = pr   ev and i = pi  v  (pi  pr)(h0  e)Ind(Qg)
in the absence of ex post regulation (L = 0), and by g = pr   ev  (1  e)t and i = pi  v with
ex post regulation (L = 1). We consider all possible equilibria which may arise in each of these
two cases (L = 0 or 1).
A coexistence equilibrium arises when i = g, 0 < g, r < i < e < 1 and 1   e <
(1   h(:))(1   r) (so that Qis < (1   h)(Qgs + Qns + Qis)). Equations ((a)-(c)), which define an
equilibrium, imply that g = 1   r. Solving the system of equations i = g and g = 1   r,
when L = 0 and when L = 1, yields the equilibrium prices given in Tables 1 and 2 for the
coexistence case. Equilibrium conditions 1 e < (1 h(:))(1 r) (which implies that r < i < e)
and e < 1 (which implies that r < 1 and therefore g > 0) respectively yield conditions 1 < vv1
and v < v2 when L = 0, 1 < vv5 and v < v6 when L = 1. It can be shown that conditions 1 <
v
v1
and v < v2 are compatible if and only if a < a0, in which case v1 is positive. Conditions 1 < vv5
and v < v6 are compatible if and only if a < a1, in which case v5 is positive.
An equilibrium with only the regular crop arises when max(i; 0) < g, r < i < e and
r < 1  e. The definition of equilibrium in ((a)-(c)) then implies that g = 1   r. Solving
this equation when L = 0 and when L = 1 yields the equilibrium prices of the regular good given
in Tables 1 and 2 for the case with regular production alone. Solving the equilibrium condition
r < 1 yields v < v3 when L = 0 and v < v8, defined by v8 =
1 a (1 e)t
e
, when L = 1.
This condition also guarantees that 0 < g. The condition 1  e is equivalent to pr + a  pi.
Straightforward calculations show that this condition is more binding than the condition r < i
(which is equivalent to 1
1 apr < pi) as long as v < v3 when L = 0 and v < v8 holds when L = 1.
The condition i < g is equivalent to pi < pr+
(1 e)v
1 h0(1 e) whenL = 0 and to pi < pr+(1 e)(v t)
when L = 1. When L = 0, the conditions pr + a  pi and pi < pr + (1 e)v1+e h0 imply v2 < v. When
L = 1, the conditions pr + a  pi and pi < pr + (1  e)(v   t) imply v6 < v. Conditions v2  v
and v < v3 and are compatible if and only if a < a0. Conditions v6  v and v < v8 are compatible
if and only if a < a1, in which case v8 always holds. When v = v2 (when L = 0) or v = v6
(when L = 1), we get a regular equilibrium at the limit with the coexistence equilibrium, where all
producers are indifferent between the GM and the IP crops but no demand exists for the IP crop.
An equilibrium with only IP arises when g < i, 0 < i, e  i  r and i < 1. The
definition of equilibrium in ((a)-(c)) then implies that i = 1   i and Qg = 0. Solving this
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equation yields the equilibrium price of the IP good given in Tables 1 and 2 for the case of IP
alone. The condition i < 1 (which implies that 0 < i) is equivalent to v < 1. The condition
r  i is equivalent to 1 a
2
(1+v)  pr. The condition g < i is equivalent to pr < 1+v2  (1 e)v
when L = 0 and pr < 1 v2 +ev+(1 e)twhen L = 1. When L = 0, the conditions 1 a2 (1+v)  pr
and pr < 1+v2   (1  e)v imply (2(1  e)  a)v < a. When L = 1, the conditions 1 a2 (1+ v)  pr
and pr < 1 v2 + ev + (1  e)t imply (2(1  e)  a)v < a+ 2(1  e)t.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We have that v2 < v6, therefore a former coexistence equilibrium cannot become an equilibrium
with only the regular crop, but a former regular equilibrium may turn into a coexistence equilib-
rium. v2 and v5 are both increasing in a, and at a = 0, @v5@a <
@v2
@a
if and only if 3h0(1  e) + t(1 
(1   e)h0) < 1, which holds if h0 and t are small enough. In this case, the curve v5 lies below
the curve v2 close to a = 0 in a (a; v) plane and a former coexistence equilibrium may remain a
coexistence equilibrium. v1, v5 and v7 are increasing in a, and at a = 0, @v1@a <
@v5
@a
< @v7
@a
. There-
fore, the curve v1 lies below the curves v5 and v7, and close to a = 0 in a (a; v) plane; a former
coexistence equilibrium become an area with no stable equilibrium or an IP equilibrium.
Expressions v2, v6 and v7 are increasing in e; v1 is increasing in e as long as a < a0; v5 is
increasing in e as long as a < a1.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
From Table 1, given that L = e = 0, pr =
1 a
2 a = p
0
r: the regular price in the coexistence equi-
librium with labeling only is identical to the regular price in the benchmark equilibrium where
GMOs are introduced without labeling. The total quantity produced and consumed is unchanged.
The welfare level with labeling only isWje=0 = 12(2 a)+v
v 2a(1 h0)
2a(1 h0)2 . The difference in welfare lev-
els with and without labeling isWje=0 W 0 = (v a(1 h0))22a(1 h0)2 > 0. Since the price of the regular good
and total quantity are unchanged, welfare effects on producers and consumers are straightforward.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Given the equilibrium prices in Table 1, we find that in a coexistence equilibrium with ex ante
regulation alone, an increase in e causes the price of the regular good to increase (@pr=@e > 0),
total production and consumption as well as producers’ profit to decrease (@g=@e < 0), and IP
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consumption to increase (@(1  ~)=@e > 0). Using the conditions a < a0 and 0 < e < h0 < 1, we
also find that the increase in e results in an increase in the price of the IP good (@pi=@e > 0) and a
decrease in regular consumption (@(~   r)=@e < 0).
In a coexistence equilibrium without ex post regulation, the welfare is given by:
W =
1
2

1 + g
2 +
(pi   pr)2
a
+
pr
2
1  a

  pi;
or equivalently:
W =
1
2
+
(1  a  ev)2
2(2  a)2 +
((1  e)v)2
2a(1 + e  h0)2 +
(1  a)(1 + ev)2
2(2  a)2  
(1  a)(1 + ev)
2  a
  (1  e)v
1 + e  h0 :
We obtain: @W
@e
je=0= v(2 h0)a(1 h0)3 (~v   v), where ~v =
a(1 h0)(3 (h0)2 a(1+(1 h0)h0))
(2 a)(2 h0) . Therefore, the
introduction of a low level of e is welfare-increasing if and only if v < ~v. When e = 0, we have
that v1 =
a(1 h0)(1+(1 a)h0)
2 a and v2 = a(1  h0), with v1 < ~v < v2.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Given the equilibrium prices in Table 2, we find that in a coexistence equilibrium with ex ante
regulation alone, an increase in t causes the price of the IP good to decrease (@pi=@t < 0), total
production and consumption as well as producers’ profit to decrease (@g=@t < 0), regular con-
sumption to decrease (@(~   r)=@t < 0), IP consumption to increase (@(1   ~)=@t > 0). Using
the condition a < 1  e, we also find that the increase in t results in an increase in the price of the
regular good (@pr=@t > 0). Changes in consumers’ utility are straightforward given price changes.
In a coexistence equilibrium with ex post regulation, the welfare is given by:
W 0 =
1
2

1 + g
2 +
(pi   pr)2
a
+
pr
2
1  a

  pi+

pi   pr
a
  pr
1  a

(1  e)t
 (h0   e)(a  pi + pr)
(1 + e  h0)a (pi   pr   (1  e)t);
or equivalently:
W 0 =
1
2
+
(1  a  ev   (1  e)t)2
2(2  a)2 +
((1  e)(v   t))2
2a
+
(1  a)(1 + ev + (1  e)t)2
2(2  a)2
 (1  a)(1 + ev + (1  e)t)
2  a   (1  e)(v   t)
+

(1  e)(v   t)
a
  1 + ev + (1  e)t
2  a

(1  e)t
 (h0   e)(a  (1  e)(v   t))
(1 + e  h0)a (1  e)v
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We have: @W
0
@t
=   (1 e)2
a
h
2t
2 a +
(h0 e)v
1+e h0
i
< 0. Therefore, the optimal level of the per-unit tax
on GM seeds (t) is zero.
From Table 1, given that L = 1 and e = t = 0, pr is unchanged compared with the price of the
regular good when there is no regulation at all. The total quantity is also unchanged.
When e = t = 0, we have v5 =
a(1+(1 a)h0)
2 a and v6 = a. The difference in welfare levels with
and without labeling is: W 0je=0;t=0  W 0 = (a v)2a(1 h0)(a(1   h0)   v(1 + h0)). v < v6 implies that
v < a, therefore this welfare difference is positive if and only if v < ~v01, with ~v
0
1 =
a(1 h0)
1+h0
. When
e = 0, we have that 0 < ~v01 < v6 while ~v
0
1 may be higher or lower than v5.
When t = 0, we have: @W
0(t=0)
@e
je=0= (2 (h0)2)va(1 h0)2 (~v02   v), with ~v02 =
a(3 (h0)2 a(1+h0 (h0)2)))
(2 a)(2 (h0)2 .
Therefore, the introduction of a low level of e is welfare-increasing if and only if v < ~v02. When
e = 0, we have that 0 < ~v02 < v6 while ~v
0
2 may be higher or lower than v5.
A.6 Proof of proposition 5
The introduction of ex post regulation maintains a coexistence equilibrium when v1 < v < v2 and
v5 < v < v6. Given t = 0 and a < a1, we have that v2 < v6 and v1 < v5, while v5 may be higher or
lower than v2. From Table 1, given that t = 0, pr is identical in the coexistence equilibrium with ex
ante regulation alone and in the coexistence equilibrium with ex ante and ex post regulations. The
difference between prices of the IP good in these two equilibria is p0i   pi =   (1 e)(h0 e)v1+e h0 < 0. It
follows that e0 < e, therefore Qd0i > Qdi .
Welfare effects on producers and consumers are straightforward. The difference in welfare
levels with and without ex post regulation is: W 0  W =   (1 e)2(e h0)2v2
2a(1+e h0)2 < 0. Therefore the cost
to taxpayers has to be larger than the utility gain for consumers.
A.7 Proof of proposition 6
The introduction of ex post regulation shifts the equilibrium from regular only to coexistence when
v2 < v < v3 and v5 < v < v6. Given t = 0 and a < a1, we have that v6 < v3 and v2 < v6 while
v5 may be higher or lower than v2 and v3. From Table 1, pr is identical in the equilibrium with ex
ante regulation alone and regular production alone and in the equilibrium with ex ante and ex post
regulations with coexistence, as long as t = 0. From the definition of g, total production is iden-
tical in both cases as long as t = 0. The welfare level with ex ante regulation and only the regular
crop is given by (1 a ev)
2
2(2 a) . After simplification, we obtain that the difference in welfare levels with
and without ex post regulation , W 0 jt=0  Wr only, is of the sign of (v6   v)

v2
1 e+h0   v

. Un-
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der the assumptions given above, the first parenthesis is positive while the second one is negative,
thereforeW 0 jt=0< Wr only for any v 2 (max(v2; v5); v6).
A.8 Proof of proposition 7
The introduction of ex post regulation shifts the equilibrium from coexistence to IP only when
v1 < v < v2 (which implies that a < a0 and therefore a < 2(1   e)) and v < v7. Given t = 0
(which we assume throughout this proof), we have that v1 < v7 while v2 may be higher or lower
than v7.
The equilibrium price of the IP good with ex ante regulation only in a coexistence equilibrium,
pi(c), is equal to the equilibrium price of the IP good with ex ante and ex post regulations and
IP only, p0i(i), if and only if v = v^1 =
a(1+e h0)
2(1 e)(1+e h0) a(1 e(1+2(h0 e))+h0) . Given a < a0 and
0 < e < h0 < 1, we obtain that v^1 < v1. Therefore, the relative levels of the two prices do not
change on the interval v 2 (v1;Min(v2; v7)). Moreover, for v = v1, we find that p0i(i) < pi(c).
Therefore, this inequality holds for v 2 (v1;Min(v2; v7)).
The equilibrium price of the regular good with ex ante regulation only in a coexistence equi-
librium, pr(c), is equal to p0i(i) if and only if v = v^2 =   a2 a 2(1 e)a . Given a < a0 and
0 < e < h0 < 1, we obtain that v^2 < v1. Therefore, the relative levels of the two prices do
not change on the interval v 2 (v1;Min(v2; v7)). Moreover, for v = v1, we find that pr(c) < p0i(i).
Therefore, this inequality holds for v 2 (v1;Min(v2; v7)).
The total production with ex ante regulation only in a coexistence equilibrium, g(c), is equal
to the total production price of the IP good with ex ante and ex post regulations and IP only, 0i(i),
if and only if v = v7. Moreover, for v = v1, we find that g(c) < 0i(i). Therefore, this inequality
holds for v 2 (v1;Min(v2; v7)).
Since g(c) < 0i(i), all producers gain when the introduction of ex post regulation shifts the
equilibrium from coexistence to IP only. All former consumers of the IP good necessarily win
from the decrease in the price of the IP good. Given that total consumption increases, all former
regular consumers turn to the IP good. Their individual utility changes from (1   a)   pr(c) to
   p0i(i). Therefore, their individual utility increases if and only if  >
p0
i(i)
 pr(c)
a
. This inequality
holds for  = r, that is for the former regular consumer characterized by the smallest , if and only
if v < v7. Therefore this inequality holds for any   r on the interval v 2 (v1;Min(v2; v7)); that
is, all former regular consumers gain. Finally, all consumers who move from consuming nothing
to consuming the IP good gain. Therefore, all consumers gain. Therefore total welfare increases.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium diagram with ex ante regulation
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Figure 2: Equilibrium diagram with ex ante regulation
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